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Abstract
While a large literature is devoted to understanding the impact of maternity leave on chil-
dren’s outcomes and the careers of women, less is known about the consequences of maternity
leave at the workplace. This paper studies the effects of maternity leave on firms and cowork-
ers by examining a 2002 Danish reform which increased the length of parental leave by 22
weeks. The timing of the policy change gives random variation in the length of leave available
to women who gave birth around the time of the reform. I find no detectable effect of the
reform on the earnings or promotions of coworkers in any of the five years after the reform
(point estimates are about $100) and can reject differences in yearly earnings larger than
$425 overall and differences larger than $280 for female coworkers. While there are some
costs for coworkers in the same occupation as women who give birth in the sample period,
these costs are 1-1.5 percent of earnings. I also find evidence that the reform increases the
probability of firm shut-down by about two percentage points five years after the reform,
concentrated among relatively small firms. Conditional on survival, I find no impact of the
reform on firm value added.
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1 Introduction
Despite substantial discussion of the impact of maternity leave on the future career paths of those
who take leave, we know nothing about the response of firms and coworkers to the absence of
an employee on parental leave. This paper is the first to document the effects of an exogenous
increase in the length of parental leave on coworkers’ career paths as well as on firm growth.
I will study the impact of parental leave extensions by taking advantage of a 2002 reform in
Denmark which substantially increased the length of parental leave.
The effect of maternity leave on coworkers and firms has played an important role in the
policy discussion of the implementation of the FMLA in the United States. In a senate hearing
of the Committee on Health, Education, and Pensions, Wyoming senator Mike Enzi notes that:
We must also bear in mind that when Congress enacted the FMLA there were genuine
concerns about weighing the needs of employees confronted by serious health issues,
the burdens which their absence might place on their coworkers who must shoulder
the additional work, and the legitimate need of employers for a steady and reliable
work force. Those concerns are equally important today.
The hearing includes specific examples of these costs, for example, the testimony of a small
business owner describing the problem of a woman taking 3 months of leave, during which the
company paid for the employees health insurance and supplemented the workers income for 6
weeks [Senate, June 23, 2005]. The employees did not return to the company and the business
owner argues that replacing her was very costly. In Denmark, 40% of women do not return
to the same job after giving birth and it is generally personally optimal for workers to keep
this information from their employers. In addition, when workers are not easily substitutable,
or when a worker has a great deal of firm-specific knowledge which takes time to build, long
absences can become costly to the firm.
The effect of maternity leave extensions on coworkers is not completely obvious. If these
extensions are costly to firms, then we should expect this to show up in wages. If, however,
employees’ responsibilities increase in response to the parental leave taken by coworkers, then
we may expect earnings to increase and promotions to be more likely among remaining coworkers.
If workers are not adequately compensated for taking on additional work, it may be that they
eventually switch to lower paying (but less demanding) jobs. All of these outcomes are observable
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and testable using Danish register data linked to birth records around the time of the parental
leave reform.
This paper estimates earnings paths of coworkers in firms employing women in 2000 who
gave birth between October 2001 and March 2002, where the women who gave birth in the
latter half of this period were eligible for 22 weeks more parental leave than those who gave
birth before the January 1st cutoff. On average, there is no impact of the reform on coworker
wages or promotions. The point estimates are very precise—for female coworkers, I can reject
yearly earnings losses greater than $160 five years after the reform and gains greater than $280
five years after the reform. However, there is some evidence of stress on workers in the same
occupation as women taking leave. These workers have somewhat smaller earnings even 5 years
after the leave-taking event and switch to lower-pay jobs in the period immediately following
leave-taking. I also find some evidence that the reform is costly for firms. Firms exposed to more
leave are 2 percentage points more likely to be shut down by five years after the reform. This
effect is concentrated in firms with between 16 and 30 employees and affects a small fraction of
the actual labor force. Conditional on survival I do not find any evidence of negative effects on
firms.
The details of this policy reform make it particularly interesting and ideal for policy evalu-
ation. While on parental leave in Denmark, workers receive full compensation from the govern-
ment up to a cap of about 3,000 kroner per week (or $2000/month).1 Before 2002, mothers were
entitled to 18 weeks of full compensation, fathers to 4 weeks of full compensation, and couples
could split an additional 10 weeks of parental leave at full compensation. This parental leave
could be taken by either the mother or the father but was almost always taken by the mother.
After January 1st, 2002, maternal leave remained the same, paternal leave was reduced by two
weeks, but parental leave was extended from 10 to 32 weeks at full pay.2 3 Except in the case
of mass layoffs, workers taking parental leave are entitled to get their job (or an equivalent job)
back after they return from leave, for up to 52 weeks. Again, an additional absence from work
of 22 weeks for women having children may affect coworkers and may take a toll of firms, in
particular when hiring temporary workers is impractical.
1Firms may top-off this public benefit, and compensation schedules are usually decided at the sector-level in
collective bargaining agreements.
2For a full description of the law, see Statistics Denmark Library (2016).
3Previously, parents could extend their benefits to 52 weeks, but only at 60% compensation.
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The policy change was unanticipated and in fact was retroactively applied to children born
after January 1st, 2002 despite being enacted on March 27th, 2002. Since optimizing around the
policy would have required planning of at least nine months, it is likely that the only immediate
impact of this extra maternity leave was the taking of extra maternity leave, not the birth of
marginal children. The reform extended the average length of maternity leave. Figure 1 below
displays the number of maternity leave spells by the length of the spell. In 2001, spells are
concentrated around 28 weeks, though some mothers do take longer maternity leave at a lower
compensation rate. In 2002, the modal length of maternity leave is 52 weeks and the number of
women taking 52 week leaves nearly quadruples.
In the early 2000s, Danish fathers took very little of the shared leave. Figure 2 below displays
the number of paternity leave spells by the length of the spell. Despite the fact that parental
leave can be taken by either the mother or the father, almost all men took 0-2 weeks of leave
both in 2001 and 2002.4
The 2002 parental leave reform lengthened the amount of maternity leave taken by many
women. In this paper, I document the effects of the 2002 parental leave reform on the outcomes
of coworkers of women who gave birth around the time of the reform. Since the reform was
retroactively applied—it was enacted in March, 2002 and first discussed (without detail or
dates) in November, 2001—it is unlikely that women who gave birth between January and
March 2002 differed substantially from those who gave birth between October and December
2001, but these groups of women were eligible for different maternity leave lengths. I find some
evidence of negative effects on coworkers in the subset of coworkers in the same occupation as
women taking leave, however, the overall impact on coworkers of this vast parental leave reform
is small.
The Danish parental leave reform studied here was much larger than proposed extensions
in other European countries and certainly larger than current policy proposals in the US which
feature paid maternity leave. The effect of this massive reform on the workplace was quite
small. It is still possible that more moderate policy changes will have dramatic effects on the
workplace, but in light of the evidence presented here this seems less likely. Before discussing the
results in more detail, section 2 of this paper discusses the literature estimating maternity leave
effects. Section 3 discusses the data and section 4 presents the results in more detail. Section 5
4Fathers not taking leave are omitted from the graph, which is in part why the number of parental leave spells
are about one third of the total births in Denmark.
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concludes.
2 Related literature
Dahl et al. [2016] study a series of reforms in Norway which increased paid maternity leave from
18 to 35 weeks. They found that in each reform the average increase in the number of weeks of
leave taken was equal to the number of weeks granted. Using a regression discontinuity design
comparing women who gave birth immediately prior to the reforms to those who gave birth after
the reforms, they find that increased maternity leave led to: no reduction in family income (the
reforms generally replaced income at 100%), had little effect on children’s school outcomes, had
no effect on parental earnings and participation in the short or in the long run, had no effect on
family structure outcomes such as completed fertility, marriage, or divorce. Finally the authors
note that families with higher income are more likely to be eligible for paid leave (since they are
working), so the expansions of paid leave are regressive. Given full take-up, the authors argue
that these expansions in paid leave were very costly (about 0.5% of GDP in 1992), without any
demonstrable effect on children’s educational outcomes or family structure.
Relative to the Norwegian reforms, the reform I study here was larger (in the sense of
increased leave time) and the ultimate amount of leave time taken when using the full allowed
time in Denmark is a substantial 50% longer. The Norwegian reforms studied by Dahl et al.
[2016] ended ten years before the Danish reform studied here. If time away from work has any
impact on the workplace, it is likely larger when time away is longer.
Baker and Milligan [2010] study a reform in Canada which increased paid maternity leave
from about 6 months to one year (approximately the level of expansion studied here) in most
provinces. Comparing across provinces with similar women but different levels of maternity leave
due to the reform, the authors found that increased maternity leave did increase the amount of
time mothers spent with their children and decrease their work hours, but it did not have any
impact on the children’s development. There was no impact on family disfunction (measured
through a survey-based scale) and no impact on the motor and social development of children.
There was little to no impact on child temperament (how much crying or smiling the child does,
for example, as reported by parents). Baker and Milligan [2008a] study the impact of leave
length extensions on mother’s re-employment and find that modest increases in mandated leave
(introduction of mandated leave of 17-18 weeks) do not affect mother’s time spent with their
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children, but did affect their probability of returning to the same employer after they give birth.
Longer increases in maternity leave mandates (of up to 70 weeks) increased the time mother’s
spent away from work and also increased re-employment.
In another paper studying Candian maternity leave mandates, Baker and Milligan [2008b]
find that even though mothers do breastfeed more under maternity leave extensions, these in-
creases in breastfeeding do not translate to better child or maternal health outcomes. Dustmann
and Schonberg [2012] study reforms in Germany and find that substantial maternity leave ex-
pansions did impact children’s outcomes well after the reforms—the null results on children’s
wages at age 28 and days in school are quite precisely estimated. Beuchert et al. [2016] also
study the impact of maternity leave expansions on the health outcomes of families, but their
study uses exactly the Danish policy reform in this paper. They find little or no effect of the
Danish reform on child or maternal health outcomes (measured by hospital admissions).
Of course, these direct effects of maternity leave expansions are an important part of under-
standing the optimal length of maternity leave from a policy perspective. However, these studies
are missing the potential costs of long worker absences to firms and potential spillover costs to
coworkers. Thomas [2015] documents the indirect effects of more maternity leave protection,
specifically, the general equilibrium impacts of the FMLA in the US. She finds evidence that
this job protection for mothers led to a lower rate of promotion for women and that part of the
reason for the slow-down in promotions was that firms know that probability that any given
women will reduce her hours in the future is larger when there are more future mothers in the
workplace which happens when the workplace becomes more attractive to mothers. The firm
response to this lower expected commitment is to reduce training and investment in all women,
even those who would not have reduced their hours.
Dahl et al. [2014] study peer effects in take-up of paternity leave. They find that coworkers
are 11 percentage points more likely to take up paternity leave if their peer was eligible for an
extra month of paternity leave (which could not be shared with the mother). This could be
because coworkers learn about the existence of this paternity leave or because they see how the
firm reacts to fathers taking leave. In general this result will be important for the interpretation
of the effects estimated in this paper, especially the impact of extra maternity leave on female
coworkers. Results on female coworkers should be interpreted with caution, since it may be
that these women learn about the generosity of parental leave through their coworkers and the
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results reported here on earnings and promotions reflect changes in their behavior based on this
information, rather than costs of coworker absence. I split the sample by gender and find similar
effects for men compared to women in the main results.
This paper directly estimates the total effects (positive or negative) of parental leave ex-
tensions on coworkers and firms. As suggested in Dahl et al. [2014], these reforms may result
in behavioral changes but since maternity leave expansions have generally not been found to
increase fertility [Dahl et al., 2016], any behavioral changes are likely small. This paper adds to
a set of results which suggest that the direct effects of paid maternity leave expansions on the
health and education of children are very small or zero. The effects on long run female labor
market participation is small, at least in Nordic countries with already generous parental leave.
This paper add the finding that there is some disruption to the workplace induced by extra
parental leave, especially for workers in the same occupation as those taking leave, but that the
overall workplace cost of extra parental leave is low.
3 Data and Model
The data used in this paper come from linking administrative registers on the Danish population.
Included in this are records of the birthdate of all children, as well as a unique identifier of the
child’s mother and father. Figure 3 below gives the number of births in each calendar month
between 2001 and 2003. While there is a slight rise in the number of births in January relative
to December, the rise is no different than in previous years and is largely explained by elective
c-sections which are not scheduled during the holiday season. As a robustness check, I use data
on hospitalizations and diagnoses to eliminate from the sample firms and coworkers of women
receiving elective c-sections in the sample period. The average number of births between October
and December is approximately equal to the number of births between January and March.
It is possible to like the mother’s ID with detailed data on her demographics and labor
market information, such as firm id, yearly earnings, hourly wages5, and occupation.6 The firm
id can be liked to the same information for all workers at the firm. In general, the Danish
administrative data has two types of firm identifiers: lbnr which corresponds to a physical work
5I only use “high-quality” hours measures (tlonkval ≤ 50). This skews the hours sample to full-time workers.
6Broad occupation categories are manager, high-skilled, white-collar, and low-skilled. In regressions, I use
3-digit ISCO categories as control variables. When reporting differences across occupations, I use the broader
categories.
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address (plant) and cvrnr which is the tax ID of the firm. Purely because lbnr is more commonly
available, I use lbnr in this study whenever possible. Studying firm value added per worker does
require the cvrnr. Unless otherwise noted, any mention of effects on the firm refer to a physical
plant/establishment, and coworker groups are constructed based on working in the same physical
location.
To form the sample, I consider the firms employing women in November 2000 who gave birth
between October 1st, 2001 and March 31st, 2002. A coworker is someone working with these
women in November 2000. There is a focus on November 2000 simply because data on workers
is collected in November of each tax year and not all women who give birth in late 2001 are
working for their previous and subsequent employer in November 2001.
It is also possible to know the length of maternity leave taken by women who gave birth
in late 2001 and early 2002. In the Danish data, maternity payments received from either the
government or the firm (who would receive a subsidy form the government) are recorded. For
each employed mother, we know the date the first benefit was received and the total benefit
received. Given benefit rates, Beuchert et al. [2016] are able to construct maternity leave spells.
I use this maternity spell data to demonstrate the large take-up of benefits in the histograms in
Figure 1 and 2. There are 9,734 firms in the dataset which employed one woman in November,
2000 who gave birth between October 1st, 2001 and March 31st 2002. An additional 3,069 firms
employed more than one woman who gave birth in the sample period. There are 20,724 women
who gave birth in the sample period employed in November, 2000. There are not significant
differences between firms employing women who gave birth before they were eligible for 52 weeks
of paid leave and those employing women who gave birth after the policy cutoff. Table 1 below
reports average age and fraction male in firms as well as firm size, by whether women giving
birth in these firms were eligible for 52 weeks of paid leave.
The effect of an increase in maternity leave on coworker outcomes depends on the nature
of production in the firm. Suppose, for example, that output follows the Kremer [1993] O-ring
Model in which the final good of a firm j consists of Nj specific tasks and one worker does each
task. Output of firm j at time t is given by Yj,t = Nj,t
∏Njt
i=1 qi,j,t. In equilibrium, every firm
has all workers of the same quality. If one member of the team leaves the firm, the firm must
replace the worker. We can imagine that for a new worker, learning how to do the task affects
his productivity and qnewi = q. This spills over to the wages of all workers in the firm. Since
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their productivity is lower as a result of a “slow” coworker.
Another possibility is that workers are perfect substitutes for one another. In this case, one
worker going on maternity leave will simply be replaced by another worker, temporarily and at
low cost in a flexible labor market.7 Using German administrative data, Ja¨ger [2016] finds that
the wages of workers in similar occupations rise, while the wages of workers in other occupations
fall when a coworker dies, effectively ruling out a frictionless model of the labor market in which
workers are perfectly substitutable.
While worker death is more permanent than maternity leave and may involve psychic costs
to coworkers, the fact that firms have to hold positions open for women taking maternity leave
adds an additional friction for the firm to overcome. In the case of worker death, the firm’s
optimal policy is clear–they must find a replacement. In the case of job-protected absence, firms
may not look for a replacement, shifting work onto coworkers. Firms cannot hire a permanent
replacement for a worker taking leave without increasing the size of their labor force. The quality
of a temporary substitute may be low enough to pull down all workers’ wages. This may cause
the firm to forgo hiring an additional worker and extract more hours and effort from its current
workforce. Of 20,718 moms working in 2000 who gave birth in the sample window, only 9,088
were working in the same firm in November of 2003. 60% return to the same job at some point
before November, 2007. Overall, the effect of job-protected leave on coworker pay is ambiguous,
potentially large, and unknown.
Even if finding a substitute for a women going on maternity leave is not difficult, there
may be promotion-based effects of increases in maternity leave on coworkers. In particular, if
promotions are internal and depend in part on tenure at the firm, a new worker hired to replace
a women taking maternity leave will be less likely to be promoted than she would have been.
Holding the promotion rate fixed, her coworker’s probability of promotion will increase.
In the next section, I present results the effect of the 2002 Danish reform on the path of
worker’s wages up to five years after they are exposed to a parental leave spell of a coworkers.
I also look at promotion rates, wage changes associated with job-to-job transitions after the
reform, and at heterogeneity in these effects by the occupation of workers. Finally, I present
7Denmark operates under a “flexicurity” model, its labor market is as flexible or more flexible than that of
the US when looking at the number of new hires and separations within a year. Low costs of hiring and firing
are supplemented with government-provided security in the form of generous welfare and job-finding help in the
case of unemployment.
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results on firm shutdown. Unfortunately, I don’t have power to meaningfully test for changes
in total number of hours in the firm or value added per worker, though point estimates suggest
that firm size grows (conditional on survival) by about half of a full-time worker when firms are
exposed to more parental leave and that there is no impact on value added per worker.
In 2000, 4% of firms employed women who gave birth in the last months of 2001 or early
months of 2002. I study the outcomes for employees at these firms, and the outcomes of the
firms themselves. The regressions reported below take the form
yit = α+ β
∑
j∈{c2000} bj1[dj > D]∑
j∈{c2000} bj
+ γXit + g(d¯) + εit (1)
where yit is the outcome of interest for worker i at date t, {c2000} is the set of coworkers in 2000.
bj indicates whether coworker j gave birth in the sample window, dj is the date of birth, and D
is the date workers are eligible for the new policy. In this case, D = January 1st, 2002. g is a
flexible polynomial in the date of coworker birth, and can vary in the pre- vs. post- treatment
window. The interpretation of β is that it gives the effect of moving from a firm in which no
women giving birth were eligible for the extra 22 weeks of leave induced by the 2002 reform to a
firm in which all women giving birth in the sample window were eligible for the benefits. Many
specifications will require me to restrict attention to firms with only one birth between October
2001 and March 2002, in which case
∑
j∈{c2000} bj1[dj>D]∑
j∈{c2000} bj
is simply an indicator of whether the
birth took place after the reform cutoff of January 1st.
In particular, adding date of coworker birth controls makes sense only when there is one
coworker birth in the sample window. In this case the regression above is the traditional re-
gressions discontinuity design (see Lee and Lemieux [2010] for a discussion). All of the results
reported below are robust to restricting the sample to one-birth firms with a flexible polynomial
in date of birth. Of course most firms are one-birth firms since the sample window is small.
The regressions below use the full sample and do not include the date of birth control unless
otherwise noted.
I estimate the equation above in the five years before coworker birth and the five years after
coworker birth: 1997-2007. There should be no effect of extra maternity leave on coworker
outcomes before the birth takes place and policy change is announced, so the pre-reform years
are included primarily to show that there are not pre-trends in coworker wages driving any
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results. These regressions also demonstrate balance since they effectively give the difference in
outcomes for workers exogenously exposed to extra maternity leave.
An alternative specification would take date of birth as an instrument for maternity leave,
and the first stage in such a regression is strong. The question asked here is the policy impact of
maternity leave extensions, which include effects of partial take-up (or possibly reduced take-up
for some workers8). I provide results of the instrumental variable strategy, which gives the effect
of an average month longer of leave among workers who responded to the policy, in the appendix.
4 Results
In this section, I present results on the effects of the 2002 maternity leave extension on coworker
earnings and career paths. The sample includes only coworkers of women who gave birth between
October, 2001 and March, 2002, where women who gave birth between January and March 2002
were eligible for almost twice as much paid leave. In addition, I check for heterogenous effects
by occupation (that of the woman taking leave and that of her coworkers) and firm size. Finally,
I study the effects of eligibility for extended leave on firms, focusing on the probability that a
branch shuts down.
4.1 Effects of maternity leave extensions on coworkers
Overall, the effects of maternity leave extensions on coworkers are small. Point estimates suggest
that by 2007, coworkers of women eligible for extra leave due to the 2002 reform were making
659 DKK (or about $100) more per year than coworkers of women ineligible for the extra
leave. Table 2 gives the results of regression (1) for 2002, 2005, and 2007 (the year of the
reform, three years later, and five years later) under a variety of specifications. In no year
and under no specifications is the effect of additional maternity leave eligibility on coworker
earnings significantly different from zero. Moving from column 1, which includes no controls,
to column 2, which includes controls for occupation, industry, age, and gender, substantially
8As is discussed in section 4.3, one problem with using this instrument is that data is available on the length of
state-funded parental leave, not on the actual absence of women from work. The straightforward interpretation
of the IV specification would be that it gives the effect of increasing the length of leave taken as induced by the
reform. But this is not necessarily the case since we do not know if workers took additional leave out of their
vacation days, sick-days, or through special provisions in their contract with their firm. For this reason, I prefer
the cleaner analysis which relies only on proper measurement of birthdates. There are also some concerns about
monotonicity—that some women may reduce their maternity leave length when longer leave is offered—these are
discussed in Beuchert et al. [2016]
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reduces standard errors, giving me power to reject even small differences in earnings. For female
coworkers (column 4), I can reject differences in 2007 earnings larger than $280, or half of a
percentage point of yearly earnings. Restricting to the subsample of firms with only one birth
between October, 2001 and March, 2002 (column 5) also does not substantially change results.
Adding a regression-discontinuity design in which the running variable is child’s date of birth in
column 6 raises standard errors to the they were at without any controls, but point estimates in
2007 are very small, as in the other specifications. Figure 4 plots estimates analogous to those
in column 2 from 1997-2007. There is no economically significant difference in the time trends
for workers exposed to more vs. less parental leave.
It is possible that there is some heterogeneity in effects by firm size. All else equal, workers at
smaller firms should be on average more affected by one coworker absence than workers at larger
firms. In addition, we may expect substantial heterogeneity by occupation—workers in the same
occupation as a woman taking leave may be more affected compared than other coworkers. In
Table 3 I give results restricting to firms with fewer than 30 employees (column 1), workers in
the same occupation as a woman giving birth (column 2), and adding an interaction term for
the number of employees in a firm (column 3) as well as the number of employees in the same
occupation as a woman giving birth, for the set of small firms (column 4). For compatibility
across the rows of this table, all of the regressions are restricted to one-birth firms. The results
restricting to firms with fewer than 30 employees have point estimates as small as those in Table
2—there is no average effect of parental leave extensions on coworker earnings in any of the five
years after the reform, with point estimates around $75 (500DKK) per year.
This is not the case when turning to column 2 of Table 3. In this case, earnings differences
are about $350-$550 per year, and are significantly different from zero in 2005 and 2002. Figure
5 plots the coefficients b from the regression
yti = α
t + bt1[same occ]× 1[dj > D]i + βt11[same occ]t + βt21[dj > D]i + γtXi + g(dj) + εti (2)
for t = 1997−2007, where 1[same occ] indicates that in 2000, worker i was in the same occupation
as a woman j who took parental leave in the sample period, 1[dj > D] indicates that this woman
gave birth after the cutoff date of Jan 1, 2002 for additional leave eligibility, X includes age,
gender, industry, and occupation dummies, and g(dj) is a linear running variable in date of
birth which varies in the pre-and post eligibility period. Standard errors are clustered at the
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firm j level and only firms with one birth are included. This specification allows me to control
for occupational heterogeneity in the effect of the reform, since simply restricting the sample to
workers in the same occupation also selects the sample on occupations where women about to
give birth tend to work. Though point estimates are different from zero at the 5% level only in
two years—2003 and 2006—there is a clear dip in same-occupation coworker earnings beginning
in 2001, when the future mothers were pregnant. There is not a difference on average in the
probability that coworkers change jobs in response to more parental leave, however, there is a
difference in the wage change associated with a job change in the period immediately following
the maternity leave spell of a coworker. Figure 6 plots the difference in log wage changes for for
workers changing jobs in that year explained by more exposure to parental leave. Conditional
on changing jobs, workers exposed to more maternity leave take a 0.5% loss in wage growth
in the year after their coworkers take parental leave. In other years, the wage changes are
comparable between the groups9. Together these findings point to some stress on employees
beginning around the time their coworkers are taking parental leave. If employers are asking
these workers to take on additional tasks, workers may prefer to take lower-paying jobs (as in
Figure 6). The initial negative effects in Figure 5 are only among workers who change jobs or
leave the firm. When I restrict the “same occupation” group to workers who remain in their
2000 firm, the negative effects begin to appear only in 2003 (but are never significantly different
from zero), as in Figure 7. Even in the long run, workers in the same occupation as women
taking leave suffer some earnings losses when they are exposed to substantially more leave. In
the next section, I will discuss the effects on firms which may help explain this finding.
Returning to Table 3 we see that there are not significant differences in the main effect when
interacting the post-reform indicator with the number of employees in a firm or with the number
of employees in an occupation, though as expected more workers in a firm and more worker in
an occupation mitigate the effects of expose to additional leave. Figure 8 splits the regression
by the size of their firm. In large firms there is a persistent pre-trend of about $150 difference
between the earnings of coworkers who will eventually work with women who give birth after the
reform eligibility compared to before, but this difference is driven by very large firms with many
pregnancies (it disappears when restricting to firms with one birth in the sample period). In
smaller firms the estimates fluctuate from a difference of -$150 to $150, but are not significantly
9this result is driven by workers in the same occupation as the women taking leave, though the difference is
not significant
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different from zero in any period. The estimates for medium-sized firms are more stable and
generally positive. They are not significantly different from zero in any period. From this figure
and Table 3 I conclude that there are not substantial differences in the effect of additional
parental leave on coworkers based on firm size.
Figure 9 plots the coefficient from a regression of log wages on the fraction of women in the
firm giving birth eligible for additional leave due to the reform by the coworker’s occupation.
I use log wages rather than earnings to make effect sizes comparable in this decomposition, as
managers make substantially more than low-skilled workers. Differences in year 2000 are indexed
to zero and standard errors are omitted, but none of these estimates is significantly different
from zero. The timeseries of these regression coefficients are not substantially different from
one another based on coworker occupation. There are also not major differences by mother’s
occupation, though these are much more noisily estimated. Figure 10 plots estimates of the
regression coefficients based on mother’s occupation. There are too few managers giving birth
in the sample period to include that breakdown, and there are fairly few high-skilled mothers so
those estimates fluctuate enormously year-to-year. Most mothers in the sample are white-collar
and low-skilled. The point estimates of the effect for these groups are low and follow similar
paths.
Finally, I consider the promotion paths of workers. In particular, I take an indicator for
whether a worker is in a management position as the outcome variable in regression (1). Table 4
gives the results of this regression under a variety of specifications, as in 2, restricting the sample
to workers who were not managers in 2000. I can reject difference in the coworker’s probability
of being promoted to management as a result of the reform larger than a tenth of a percentage
point. To give meaning to this figure, in 2007, 1.91% of workers who were not in management
positions in 2000 were in management positions. So I can reject differences in promotion to
management of about 5 percent of the level. Figure 11 plots a similar outcome over time—the
coefficients on whether a worker is a manager (so that all years can be included). There is no
baseline difference and no difference as a result of the taking of leave in the probability that
coworkers are in management positions.
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4.2 Effects of maternity leave extensions on firms
The final set of results in this paper turns from coworkers to firms. In this section, I restrict
to firms with more than 5 employees to avoid family businesses whose employment records are
less reliable and because accounting data is unavailable for firms with fewer than five employees.
Figure 12 displays coefficients from a regression of whether it is the firm’s last year in the
dataset on the fraction of births at the firm which took place after the reform and were eligible
for more parental leave. The sample consists of firms employing women in 2000 who gave birth
between October 1st 2001 and March 31st 2002. Table 5 presents the probability that a firm
is shutdown—there are no workers at that plant—in 2007. Overall, firms exposed to more
maternity leave due to the reform are 6.94% (or about 2 percentage points) more likely to be
shutdown by 2007. This result is remarkably stable across specifications, however it is just shy
of significance at the 10% level using the regression discontinuity approach in column 4, despite
increasing in magnitude to 3.2 percentage points.
Figure 12 presents the coefficients from regression (1) in which the outcome variable is an
indicator of whether the firm exists in a given year. In the baseline there is a larger probability
of shutdown among firms exposed to less maternity leave, and the difference is significant in
2002. However this is somewhat mechanical since women who give birth in 2002 will still be on
employment rolls in that year, while women giving birth in 2001 may not be. In fact, restricting
to firms with more than 15 employees, the 2002 coefficient is 0.0028 which is insignificantly
different from zero. These firms are however more likely to be shut down in 2007. Table 6
describes the shutdown-probabilities by firm size. All firms are more likely to be shut down by
2007 if they were exposed to more parental leave, but the effect is largest for firms with 16-30
employees. About five percent of the workforce in my sample overall is in firms this size, though
they represent about 25% of firms in the data.
In Denmark, accounting data is available for firms (broadly available after 1999). These data
include measures of value added and total number of full time equivalent workers. There are
three main drawbacks to using this data. First, this information is available at the firm rather
than establishment level. This means that it excludes the public sector and in general has far
fewer observations than the exercises above (because all plants will be linked together). A bigger
problem with the data is that firms are surveyed based on size and while firms with 50 or more
employees are well represented in the data (surveyed annually), smaller firms are not surveyed
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every year—the very presence of a firm in the accounting data indicates success. Imputed values
are available for these firms, but measurement error coming from that imputation makes this
exercise—particularly the regression discontinuity—impractical. Finally, the measure of full
time equivalent workers (aarsv) explicitly excludes temporary workers, so I do not have a solid
measure of the effect on firm size.
Nonetheless, I provide estimates of the effects of the maternity leave extension on value
added per worker (revenue less the cost of material inputs and capital rental) and full time
equivalent workers. Though I cannot reject large effects on firm value-added and labor force
size, point estimates do not suggest that conditional on survival firms suffer from an increase
in parental leave. In particular, Table 7 shows that though my confidence bands are about 5%
differences in value added per worker, point estimates are very small, around 1 percent. Note
that the workers in this sample are those currently in the firm, which differs from the coworker
regressions above in which coworker groups were determined in 2000 and after that could change
firms, become unemployed, etc. In addition, Table 8 implies that firms hire about 17 hours more
per week of labor (half a full-time equivalent worker) and seem to keep this worker years after
the reform when they are exposed to 22 weeks more of potential parental leave. Unfortunately,
the standard errors on this estimate are wide and include zero.
Overall, the results suggest that parental leave extensions result in a 2 percentage point
larger probability of firm shutdown 5 years after the reform. This shutdown is driven by firms
with 16-30 employees, not by larger or smaller firms. There do not seem to be negative effects
on value added per worker for surviving firms, though I can’t rule out effects as large as 5%.
In addition, according to my point estimates, these firms hire about 17 additional hours of
labor in the year in which workers take maternity leave when they are exposed to 22 weeks
more of potential leave, controlling for the amount of labor in the firm in 2000. Firms do not
shed the extra labor even five years after the reform, though I note again that the results are
only suggestive since the effects are not precisely measured. In the next section I consider the
robustness of these results to the exclusion of women getting elective c-sections in the sample
window, since these are not randomly distributed around the policy cutoff. In addition, I present
IV versions of the main effects.
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4.3 Robustness
The results above identify the causal effect of parental leave extensions on firms under the
assumption that whether a woman gives birth in late 2001 or early 2002 is as good as random.
The regression discontinuity specifications add a control for date of birth identifying off the
break between late December, 2001 and early January, 2002. One problem with this assumption
is that a small fraction of women receive elective c-sections which are scheduled in the window
of a few weeks. In Figure 3, there is a jump in the number of births between December and
January, which is surprising since these months have the same length. Most of this is explained
by the fact that 350 elective c-sections occur per month in Denmark in this period, and these
are not scheduled in the last weeks of December due to holidays. If possible, they are postponed
to early January10.
Since women who have elective c-sections may be a selected group, and so their coworkers
and employers may be selected, I drop these women from the sample in the results reported
in Appendix Tables 9 and 10. This has no effect on the baseline coworker earnings regressions
(column 1 of Table 9), or on the heterogeneity results in the remaining columns. Omitting all
women who had elective c-sections in 2001 and 2002 reduces the sample by enough to make
the earnings results for coworkers in the same occupation insignificant, though the magnitude
of the estimates is unchanged. The effects on firms are also unchanged. Table 10 gives the
analogue of Table 5 but eliminates c-sections. The point estimates still suggest a little more
than 2 percentage point higher probability of firm shutdown for firms exposed to an additional
22 weeks of potential leave. However, the regression discontinuity estimate falls by about one
percentage point (and remains insignificant).
Next, I turn to the robustness of the effects to an IV specification. The data on leave-taking
is specifically state-paid leave. It is possible that women take more leave by using sick-days,
vacation days, and get more leave through their firm. For this reason, the effect of “additional
leave” should be interpreted with caution—it is not necessarily true that a worker who took 30
weeks of state-paid leave was absent from work for 30 weeks. The number could be substantially
higher. The interpretation of reform-eligibility used in this paper so far is less controversial and
while it includes the effects for women who did not change their actual leave-taking in response
10I don’t know the date of the procedure, only the year, so I cannot exactly count the number of cases which
are postponements.
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to the reform, it is a cleanly measured policy response. Nonetheless, it is possible use data on
state-paid leave to get a sense of the effects of leave-taking on coworkers and firms. Note that
The first stage is in Table 11 and is a regression of total weeks of parental leave at the firm
taken up to 1 year after childbirth by female employees in 2000 who gave birth between October
1st, 2001 and March 31st, 2002 on the fraction of births at the firm which took place after
January 1st, 2002 and so were eligible for 52 weeks of leave. There is, on average, 5.6 weeks
more parental leave taken at firms in which births took place after January 1st, 2002 compared
to firms in which births took place before January 1st, 2002. Table 12 gives the effect of an
additional week of actual leave taking induced by the reform on coworker wages and promotion
to management. Neither of these is significantly different from zero and the magnitudes are very
small. Multiplying the point estimates by the average increase in leave, the effects are larger
than the non-IV effects, as expected since not all women take advantage of the reform. The
firm effects in Table 13 are similarly stronger than the OLS-based results, and are significantly
different from zero.
5 Conclusion
This paper studied the workplace effects of a 2002 Danish reform which increased the length of
paid parental leave available to mothers by 22 weeks. The timing of the reform—first discussed in
the November, 2001 elections, implemented in March, 2002 and retroactively applied to women
who gave birth January 1st, 2002 or later—creates exogenous variation in the length of parental
leave for which similar women were eligible. This paper is the first to document the effects of
such a parental leave extension on coworkers of the women taking leave and their firms. When
workers are difficult to temporarily replace these workplace effects could potentially be large.
Comparing coworkers of women who gave birth between October 1st, 2001 and December
31st, 2001 to those of women who gave birth in the subsequent three months (and were eligible
for 22 weeks more of leave), I find that the overall effect of parental leave extensions on coworkers
wages are quite precisely zero. There is some evidence of stress on workers in the same occupation
as women eligible for extra leave. Immediately following the leave, those workers who make job-
to-job transitions have lower wages than those exposed to a shorter leave-spell. In addition,
workers in the same occupation exposed to more coworker leave have yearly earnings about
$375 lower as a result of the reform in 2007. In other groups, there are no effects of the reform.
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I also precisely estimate no effects on promotion rates.
Turning to firm outcomes, I do find that firms are overall two percentage points, or about
seven percent, more likely to be shut down five years after a Danish parental leave extension from
28 to 52 weeks if they employed a women who was eligible for the leave relative to those employing
women who were not eligible. This effect is concentrated in firms with 15-30 employees—the
employee-weighted effect on shutdown is negligible. Conditional on survival, I don’t find any
evidence that firm value added per worker is lower as a result of the increased parental leave.
Point estimates suggest that firms do permanently grow by about half of a full time worker when
they are exposed to 52 weeks of leave, but I’m underpowered to detect an effect different from
zero for firm size.
The economic impacts of the Danish parental leave reform on the workplace overall is negli-
gible. There are on average no earnings effects on coworkers and firm effects are concentrated in
relatively small firms. The results do suggest some stress (both in terms of earnings and wage
changes associated with job transitions) on coworkers in the same occupation as a woman taking
leave, but these effects are not dramatic. Given the magnitude of the Danish reform studied
here, the small effects on coworkers and firms are evidence that firms and coworkers in general
are able to adjust to long absences induced by job-protected parental leave.
18
References
Michael Baker and Kevin Milligan. How does job-protected maternity leave affect mothers
employment? Journal of Labor Economics, 26:655–692, 2008a.
Michael Baker and Kevin Milligan. Maternal employment, breastfeeding, and health: Evidence
from maternity leave mandates. Journal of Health Economics, 27:871–887, 2008b.
Michael Baker and Kevin Milligan. Evidence from maternity leave expansions of the impact of
maternal care on early child development. Journal of Human Resources, 45(1), 2010.
Louise Voldby Beuchert, Maria Knoth Humlum, and Rune Vejlin. The length of maternity leave
and family health. Labour Economics, 2016.
Gordon B. Dahl, Katrine V. Lken, and Magne Mogstad. Peer effects in program participation.
American Economic Review, 104(7):2049–74, 2014.
Gordon B. Dahl, Katrine Løken, Magne Mogstad, and Kari Vea Salvanes. What is the case for
paid maternity leave? Review of Economics and Statistics, forthcoming, 2016.
Christian Dustmann and Uta Schonberg. Expansions in maternity leave coverage and children’s
long-term outcomes. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 4(3):190–224, 2012.
Simon Ja¨ger. How substitutable are workers? evidence from worker deaths, 2016. Job Market
Paper.
Michael Kremer. The o-ring theory of economic development. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 108(3):551–575, 1993.
David S. Lee and Thomas Lemieux. Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics. Journal of
Economic Literature, 48(2):281–355, June 2010.
Statistics-Denmark Library. Dagpenge ved graviditet, fødsel og adoption: Statistikkens grundlag
1993-2009. http://www.dst.dk/Site/Dst/SingleFiles/hojkvalbilag.aspx?statomrid=53747&bilagid=95576.
Data retrieved August 8th, 2016.
United States Senate. Washington, d.c. One Hundred Ninth Congress first session on Examining
the Family Medical Leave Act, Hearing of the committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions, June 23, 2005.
19
Mallika Thomas. The impact of mandated maternity benefits on the gender differential in
promotions: Examining the role of adverse selection. mimeo, 2015.
20
Figures
Figure 1: This figure displays the number of maternity leave spells by the length of the spell. In
2001, spells are concentrated around 28 weeks, though some mothers do take longer maternity
leave at a lower compensation rate. In 2002, the modal length of maternity leave is 52 weeks
and the number of women taking 52 week leaves nearly quadruples.
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Figure 2: This figure displays the number of paternity leave spells by the length of the spell.
Despite the fact that parental leave can be taken by either the mother or the father, almost all
men took 0-2 weeks of leave both in 2001 and 2002 (fathers not taking leave are omitted from
the graph).
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Figure 3: This figure displays the number of births on Denmark, by month, between January
1st, 2001 and December 31st, 2002.
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Figure 4: This figure displays coefficients from a regression of coworker yearly earnings (in
Danish kroner) on the fraction of births at the firm which took place after the reform and were
eligible for more parental leave. The sample consists of coworkers of women who gave birth
between October 1st 2001 and March 31st 2002. Coworkers were determined in 2000. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Figure 5: This figure displays coefficients from a regression of coworker yearly earnings (in
Danish kroner) on an indicator of whether a coworker was eligible for 52 weeks of parental leave
interacted with whether a worker was in the same occupation as a woman giving birth between
October 1st 2001 and March 31st 2002 in firms which had only one birth during this 6-month
period. Coworkers were determined in 2000. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Figure 6: This figure displays coefficients from a regression of coworker log wage change is 2003
relative to 2002 for workers who changed jobs between 2002 and 2003 on an indicator of whether
a coworker was eligible for 52 weeks of parental leave. The sample consists of coworkers of women
who gave birth between October 1st 2001 and March 31st 2002 in firms which had only one birth
during this 6-month period. Coworkers were determined in 2000. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level.
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Figure 7: This figure displays coefficients from a regression of coworker yearly earnings (in
Danish kroner) on an indicator of whether a coworker was eligible for 52 weeks of parental
leave interacted with whether a worker was in the same occupation as a woman giving birth
between October 1st 2001 and March 31st 2002 in firms which had only one birth during this
6-month period. Only workers who stay in the same job in a given year are included in the
“same occupation” group. Coworkers were determined in 2000. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level.
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Figure 8: This figure displays coefficients from a regression of coworker yearly earnings (in
Danish kroner) on the fraction of births at the firm which took place after the reform and were
eligible for more parental leave, by firm size. The sample consists of coworkers of women who
gave birth between October 1st 2001 and March 31st 2002. Coworkers were determined in 2000.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Figure 9: This figure displays coefficients from a regression of coworker log wages (in Danish
kroner) on the fraction of births at the firm which took place after the reform and were eligible
for more parental leave, by broad occupation groups. The sample consists of coworkers of women
who gave birth between October 1st 2001 and March 31st 2002. Coworkers were determined in
2000 and the time-series are normalized to 2000 = 0. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level.
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Figure 10: This figure displays coefficients from a regression of coworker yearly earnings (in
Danish kroner) on an indicator of whether a coworker was eligible for 52 weeks of parental leave,
by the mothers’ broad occupation group. The sample consists of coworkers of women who gave
birth between October 1st 2001 and March 31st 2002 in firms which had only one birth during
this 6-month period. Coworkers were determined in 2000 and the time-series are normalized to
2000 = 0. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Figure 11: This figure displays coefficients from a regression of whether a worker is in a man-
agement position on the fraction of births at the firm which took place after the reform and
were eligible for more parental leave. The sample consists of coworkers of women who gave birth
between October 1st 2001 and March 31st 2002. Coworkers were determined in 2000.
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Figure 12: This figure displays coefficients from a regression of whether it is the firm’s last year
in the dataset on the fraction of births at the firm which took place after the reform and were
eligible for more parental leave. The sample consists of firms employing women in 2000 who
gave birth between October 1st 2001 and March 31st 2002. The sample is restricted to firms
which existed (paid wages) in the years leading up to shutdown and did not re-emerge after
shutdown.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics
Birth between Oct. & Dec. Birth between Jan. & Mar. p-value
Fraction male 0.3717 0.3721 0.943
(0.2538) (0.2575)
Average age 36.6411 36.6235 0.897
(6.7061) (6.7166)
Average earnings 184423 183039.2 0.436
(88256) (86806.69)
Number employees 36.0996 37.1830 0.363
(60.5954) (56.9248)
N 4789 4945
Sample is restricted for firms which had 1 birth between October 1st, 2001 and March 31st,
2002.
Table 2: Earnings regressions: coefficient on fraction of births post-reform
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2002 earnings -1341.9 66.6 -106.0 248.9 -570.9 1512.8
(3175.47) (952.48) (1532.92) (669.15) (895.17) (1917.26)
2005 earnings 172.0 200.1 81.9 392.5 -904.5 -2103.1
(3006.5) (1111.8) (1788.3) (807.5) (1123.8) (2316.3)
2007 earnings 1652.7 659.0 1011.3 379.7 886.9 -391.8
(2905.20) (1108.00) (1907.72) (759.17) (1123.13) (2584.60)
Sample Full Full Males Females 1 birth 1 birth
Controls N Y Y Y Y Y
Date of birth N N N N N Y
N 900742 900734 413295 487439 323002 323002
Dependent variable is a worker’s earnings in a given year (in DKK). Controls include occu-
pation (3-digit ISCO), industry (2 digit), age, and gender fixed effects, as well as year 2000
earnings. The last column is a regression discontinuity, with date of coworker’s birth as the
running variable. Other columns identify off average differences between the two groups.
Standard errors, clustered at the establishment level, in parentheses. 1000 DKK ≈ $ 150
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Table 3: Earnings regressions with heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2002 earnings (in DKK)
Post 534.0637 -3139.471** -1004.811 1826.344
(987.5579) (1594.548) (1728.892) (1582.271)
Post × n emp. 2.313004
(14.56994)
n employees -2.251122
(15.24144)
Post × n in occ. -177.5228
(188.215)
n in occupation 533.8951***
(134.5842)
2005 earnings (in DKK)
Post 368.8257 -3686.77** -431.7932 1729.646
(1141.52) (1785.83) (1984.053) (1829.033)
Post × n emp. -4.886115
(17.28158)
n employees -3.876897
(16.40887)
Post × n in occ. -188.5555
(217.5679)
n in occupation 525.2902***
(155.5732)
2007 earnings (in DKK)
Post -570.9073 -2295.634 -905.1598 1482.247
(1269.376) (1726.421) (1870.027) (2034.029)
Post × n emp. 14.83248
(15.59159)
n employees -11.088
(14.15825)
Post × n in occ. -301.1767
(241.9528)
n in occupation 411.4506**
(173.0098)
Sample 1 birth, 1 birth, 1 birth 1 birth,
<= 30 employees Same occupation Same occupation,
<= 30 employees
N 67876 102666 323006 67876
Dependent variable is a worker’s earnings in a given year (in DKK). Controls include occu-
pation (3-digit ISCO), industry (2 digit), age, and gender fixed effects, as well as year 2000
earnings. The last column is a regression discontinuity, with date of coworker’s birth as the
running variable. Other columns identify off average differences between the two groups.
Standard errors, clustered at the establishment level, in parentheses. 1000 DKK ≈ $ 150
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Table 4: Probability in management
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2002 Pr(management) 0.000662 0.000566 0.001242 -0.000076 0.000526 0.000779
(0.000534) (0.000513) (0.000854) (0.000427) (0.000582) (0.001084)
2005 Pr(management) -0.000620 -0.000415 -0.000946 -0.000022 0.000426 0.001451
(0.000880) (0.000770) (0.001249) (0.000586) (0.000812) (0.001495)
2007 Pr(management) 0.000461 0.000256 0.000252 0.000140 0.000133 0.000847
(0.000778) (0.000699) (0.001151) (0.000581) (0.000808) (0.001518)
Sample Full Full Males Females 1 birth 1 birth
Controls N Y Y Y Y Y
Date of birth N N N N N Y
N 876005 875997 394594 481403 311514 311514
Dependent variable is an indicator of whether a worker is in a management position in the reported
year. Controls include occupation (3-digit ISCO), industry (2 digit), age, and gender fixed effects,
as well as year 2000 earnings. The last column is a regression discontinuity, with date of coworker’s
birth as the running variable. Other columns identify off average differences between the two groups.
Standard errors, clustered at the establishment level, in parentheses.
Table 5: Firms shutdown regressions: coefficient on fraction of births post-
reform
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Shutdown in 2007 .0215316** .0219726** .0297112*** .0325219
(.0094423) (.009408) (.0101067) (.0204759)
Sample Full Full 1 birth 1 birth
Controls N Y Y Y
Date of birth N N N Y
N 11066 11066 8063 8063
Dependent variable is an indicator of whether a firm has no records in the
tax register in the reported year. Controls include industry (2 digit level),
a quadratic in number of employees in 2000. The regression discontinuity
control (1 birth sample) includes a linear term in date of birth which varies
in the pre-and-post period. The sample consists of firms employing women in
2000 who gave birth between October 1st 2001 and March 31st 2002.
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Table 6: Probability of shutdown by firm size
≤15 employees 16-30 employees > 30 employees
2002 Pr(shutdown) -.0356*** .0141 -.0024
(.0107) (.0131) (.0084)
2007 Pr(shutdown) .0112 .0646*** .0104
(.0156) (.0202) (.0144)
Controls Y Y Y
Date of birth N N N
N 3633 2107 5326
Dependent variable is an indicator of whether a firm has no records in the
tax register in the reported year. Controls include industry (2 digit level),
a quadratic in number of employees in 2000. The sample consists of firms
employing women in 2000 who gave birth between October 1st 2001 and
March 31st 2002.
Table 7: Log value added per worker
log VA per worker in year: 2002 2005 2007
Fraction post -.0021 -.0133 .0079
(.0210) (.0247) (.0263)
Sample Full Full Full
Controls Y Y Y
Date of birth N N N
R-squared 0.2119 0.1278 0.0814
N 2365 2041 1882
This table displays coefficients from a regression of the log
value added (revenue less the cost of material inputs and
capital) per full-time equivalent worker in a firm on the
fraction of births at the firm which took place after the re-
form and were eligible for more parental leave, controlling
for the size of the firm in 2000, value added per worker in
2000 (both as quadratics) and industry in 2000. The sam-
ple consists of firms employing women in 2000 who gave
birth between October 1st 2001 and March 31st 2002 who
had non-imputed accounting data in 2000.
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Table 8: Full-time equivalent workers
FTE in year: 2002 2005 2007
Fraction post 0.4590 0.4701 0.4396
(0.4329) (0.8103) (1.0127)
Sample Full Full Full
Controls Y Y Y
Date of birth N N N
R-squared 0.5039 0.2661 0.2083
N 2516 2318 2226
This table displays coefficients from a regression
of the number of full-time equivalent workers in
a firm on the fraction of births at the firm which
took place after the reform and were eligible for
more parental leave, controlling for the size of
the firm in 2000, value added per worker in 2000
(both as quadratics) and industry in 2000. The
sample consists of firms employing women in
2000 who gave birth between October 1st 2001
and March 31st 2002 who had non-imputed ac-
counting data in 2000.
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Appendix Tables
Table 9: Earnings regressions with heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2002 earnings (in DKK)
Post -1751.3 33.9 -2503.3 -1895.5 798.1
(1499.4) (1495.2) (1744.9) (1609.4) (2535.5)
Post × n emp. 7.04
(14.9)
n employees -8.94
(15.3)
Post × n in occ. -99.61
(288.3)
n in occupation 548.51***
(202.73)
2005 earnings (in DKK)
Post -2077.6 -19.5 -2660.8 -1727.8 1449.0
(1584.6) (1603.8) (1894.5) (1903.1) (2720.7)
Post × n emp. 0.97
(18.1)
n employees -10.17
(17.5)
Post × n in occ. -208.91
(315.1)
n in occupation 577.24**
(224.2)
2007 earnings (in DKK)
Post -446.7 -1241.3 -2104.3 -1651.5 627.6
(1510.7) (1699.2) (1827.0) (1775.3) (2876.8)
Post × n emp. 17.15
(15.5)
n employees -13.98
(15.4)
Post × n in occ. -276.87
(331.3)
n in occupation 434.70*
(221.8)
Sample Full 1 birth, 1 birth, 1 birth 1 birth,
<= 30 emp. Same occ. Same occ.,
<= 30 emp.
N 253537 61183 79012 253540 61183
Dependent variable is a worker’s earnings in a given year (in DKK). This sample excludes
coworkers of women who received elective c-sections. Controls include occupation (3-digit
ISCO), industry (2 digit), age, and gender fixed effects, as well as year 2000 earnings.
Standard errors, clustered at the establishment level, in parentheses. 1000 DKK ≈ $ 150
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Table 10: Firms shutdown regressions: coefficient on fraction of births post-
reform
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Shutdown in 2007 .0254285** .0257709** .0313589*** .0227443
(.0103591) (.0103152) (.0108969) (.0220931)
Sample Full Full 1 birth 1 birth
Controls N Y Y Y
Date of birth N N N Y
N 11066 11066 8063 8063
Dependent variable is an indicator of whether a firm has no records in the
tax register in the reported year. This sample excludes coworkers of women
who received elective c-sections. Controls include industry (2 digit level),
a quadratic in number of employees in 2000. The regression discontinuity
control (1 birth sample) includes a linear term in date of birth which varies
in the pre-and-post period. The sample consists of firms employing women in
2000 who gave birth between October 1st 2001 and March 31st 2002.
Table 11: First stage regression results
Fraction post-reform 5.622769***
(1.0554458)
Constant 22.84535***
(0.7224492)
F-stat 28.38
N 12803
Outcome variable is total weeks
parental leave at the establishment
in 2000 from women giving birth be-
tween October, 2001 and March, 2002.
Table 12: IV regression results: coefficient on total parental leave
Dependent variable: 2002 2005 2007
Yearly earnings of year 2000 coworkers (in DKK): 79.6 183 275
(313) (305) (314)
Fraction promoted to management: -0.00009 0.00002 0.00007
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
N 12803 12803 12803
Coworker outcome IV regressions. Dependent variable is listed in the rows, indepen-
dent variable is the total weeks parental leave at the firm in 2000 using the fraction
of workers giving birth between October, 2001 and March, 2002 who were eligible for
the reform as an instrument.
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Table 13: IV regression results—firms
Year of Shutdown 2002 2005 2007
Total parental leave -0.00178 0.00002 0.00215*
(0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0016)
Constant 0.1441*** 0.2181*** 0.2943***
(0.0139) (0.0173) (0.0204)
Firm outcome IV regressions. Outcome variable is prob-
ability that an establishment is gone in the indicated year,
independent variable is the total weeks parental leave at that
establishment in 2000 using the fraction of workers giving
birth between October, 2001 and March, 2002 who were el-
igible for the reform as an instrument.
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